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Abstract 
 
Forensic economists often present to the courts an estimate of the value of amounts required to 
compensate for particular losses.  Such estimates, dependent upon particular sets of unique 
circumstances, the timing of benefits and losses, and the replacement cost of the value of the specific 
losses sustained, vary over a wide range. 
 
Wide variations in these estimates, no matter the validity of the amounts projected, may prevent 
acceptance of any specific estimate by the judicial system.  That is, the constraints imposed by the 
institutional structure of the judicial system may act to restrict the acceptability of properly 
estimated, economically justifiable estimates. 
 
Thus, if victims are "to be made whole" (a non-conflicting goal of both the courts and forensic 
economists) means to rectify institutional alienation must be developed and maintained. The Primary 
goal of this paper is to, at least in part, provide some insight into accomplishing this goal.  In doing 
this, the following procedure is being followed: first, following an introduction an abbreviated 
description of the methods used by economists when making their estimates is provided; second, the 
legal-institutional criteria imposed by the legal system and used to determine the acceptability of any 
given estimate is outlined; and, third a means of forecasting the legal acceptability of any specific 
economic estimate is presented. The economist can then use that knowledge when preparing 
testimony, thus increasing the probability that the resulting decision will better meet the standards 
imposed by the judicial system, without violating economic norms. 
 
 
Introduction:  Goals and Methodology 
 
goal of forensic economics is to help insure that an injured party is made whole.  This, in turn, provides 
the economist with a frame of reference leading to systematic analysis of the value of an individual's 
loss. This process is one of positive economics, as contracted to the court's goal of establishing 
normative objectives for attaining justice. 
 
 The forensic economist attempts to attain his goal by use of statistical methods.  Starting with the real world, by 
means of experimental abstraction, he arrives at an experimental design, obtains and analyzes real world data, applies 
statistical interpretations, and arrives at real world conclusions.  In this way, the economist analyzes a specific problem 
and suggests efficient means to attain the desired end. 
 
 The legal system, on the other hand, is more likely to use deductive methodology.  Abstracting from the real 
world, it creates a logical model which reduces real world complexities to theoretical abstractions, applying logical 
arguments to the result in order to arrive at logical conclusions.  These are then transformed, by use of rational 
interpretation, into conclusions about the real world, and used to decide specific cases, becoming a part of case law. 
 
 These two methods, empirical and deductive, are sometimes complementary, but may lead to contradictory 
results; i.e. they may be mutually reinforcing, or lead to mutually exclusive results.  However, given the adversarial 
A 
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institutional legal system of the United States, it is more likely that the results will be contradictory than that they will be 
reinforcing--and will not meet the goal of either the forensic economist, or of the legal system. 
 
 Alternatively stated, dynamic inconsistency problems often arise between the courts and the economists 
because of the freedom of the courts to reassess analysis that is fully acceptable within the economics discipline.  The 
courts may then choose any alternative course of action, which seems preferable at the time.  The long-term effect of 
such economic inconsistencies may defeat the complementary goals of making whole while achieving justice, because 
what appears preferable in the short run violates fundamental long run principles. 
 
General Duties of the Forensic Economist 
 
 Forensic economists are assigned the responsibility of providing the court an estimate of the present value of 
the amount required to compensate for some specific loss.  Because these estimates are dependent upon the particular set 
of circumstances unique to the individual case, the timing of benefits and losses, and the replacement cost of lost values, 
individual case estimates may legitimately vary over a very large range. 
 
 Those with extensive experience in making--and justifying--such estimates often have concluded that no matter 
the economic accuracy of the inquiry, any given estimate may be rejected due to the institutional framework of the 
judicial system.  That is, the constraints imposed by the judicial-institutional structure in which the measured value is 
presented may prevent it from being accepted.  Such outcomes often directly result from the differences in the criterion 
used by economists relative to the criterion utilized by the judicial system. 
 
 However, differing processes do not necessarily lead to outcome rejection.  With adequate preparation the 
economist can present his valid estimate, derived from objective analysis, in a manner designed to gain the court's 
acceptance.  For this to occur, the economist must be fully prepared to defend, to the extent required, that estimate.  And, 
a successful defense is not probable unless the economist has acquired prior knowledge as to what extent justification 
will be required. 
 
 The primary purpose of this paper is to present some thoughts on estimating acceptability, to the judicial 
system, of an amount required to fairly compensate for economic losses.  The remaining material is presented as follows: 
First there is an abbreviated discussion of the methods used by economists to make their estimates, followed by an 
outline of the legal-institutional criteria used by the courts when determining the acceptability of a given estimate.  This 
is followed by a section which briefly outlines a means by which an objective judgment may be rendered as to its 
judicial acceptability.  After this a short summary and conclusions are provided. 
 
Estimating Options 
 
 Options available for evaluating losses may be classified relative to one of three specific approaches.  These 
are: 
 
(1) opportunity cost analysis 
(2) activity analysis 
(3) replacement analysis.   
 
Each approach is briefly described below. 
 
(1) Opportunity cost analysis (sometimes referred to as comparable worth analysis) is the most popular with 
lawyers who represent plaintiffs.  The use of this approach often yields very high estimates.  This is because the 
loss estimate rests upon a base derived from the greatest amount foregone in order to provide for replacement, 
i.e. to cover the opportunity cost.  Thus, it favors high market values, assuming that the losses are analogous in 
value to market services which could have been provided.  Defense attorneys, judges, and/or jurors often 
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perceive such estimates to be unrealistic and/or unfair. 
 
(2) Activity analysis (often called functional analysis) proceeds by classifying losses into the number of hours 
which would have been spent in specific activities.  The per hour market value of each activity is then 
determined, and used to multiply the given number of hours of lost service.  These figures are then summed 
and the result is the estimate for the dollar value of the total amount of loss.  This process appears to be straight 
forward and simple.  However, the degree of insight and knowledge, and the amount of accurate data required 
is extensive.  It is almost impossible to discover how much time would have been spent on any given activity.  
In addition, any attorney or judge is likely to question if a mother's application of a band-aid plus a kiss on a 
skinned knee is equivalent in value to a nurse's application of medication and a bandage, or if a child born of 
college educated individuals would have likely grown up to become a teacher, an engineer, or a business 
executive. 
 
(3) Replacement analysis centers upon the cost of providing substitute services.  Of the three, this approach is the 
most easily explained.  But, plaintiff attorneys, some judges and some jurors are likely to find this approach 
objectionable.  They have likely observed that hired help does not usually provide either the quantity or quality 
of services lost, and that many losses are simply irreplaceable.  For those which can be replaced, it is observed 
that some housekeepers do not do windows, yard men cannot be depended upon to drop off or pick up kids at 
school, and few hired for a market wage are capable of providing the willing ear for a troubled child. 
 
 Given the specific time, place, and circumstances any or any mix of these alternatives may be used to meet the 
goal of making the plaintiff whole, remembering that this includes meeting the requirement that the solution be 
satisfactory to any with veto authority.  That is, the economist must provide--and justify--an objective estimate of the 
present value of the amount required to compensate for any loss.  Obviously, this is not a simple task, even though high 
r-squares and other statistical measures provide cardinal standards, which logically indicate that the results are 
acceptable, for the specific (unique) case, within defined ordinal limits. 
 
The Legal-Institutional Acceptance Criteria 
 
 Mentioned previously was the fact that no matter how analytically correct the economist's estimate, it may not 
be accepted by the court or its officers, unless fully justified.  To gain that acceptance may be very difficult because, the 
court's acceptance criteria differs significantly from the economist's.  This is especially true when one is trying to value 
losses that have not been valued by legislative act, administrative decree, or prior case law. 
 
 Case law is the means used for accepting or rejecting evidence in most non-criminal tort proceedings.  That is, 
the legal standard to be met is defined by the doctrine of stare decisis.  This concept reflects the fundamental values of 
the legal process.  In substance, stare decisis (precedent) is used by the court to identify ambiguities, to clarify 
obscurities, to shed light on the possibility that a ruling will be overturned on appeal, but most of all to provide the court 
with a decision making rule. 
 
 Forensic economists should find stare decisis of interest for a particular reason.  Any recommendation to the 
court, which is assumed to have no pecuniary interest in the outcome, outside the range of precedent is likely to be 
rejected unless adequately justified relative to the particular court and jurisdiction--at the time of the initial 
presentation of the finding. 
 
 The idea that precedent rules requires that economists appreciate the problem of uncertainty that plagues court 
personnel when cases are decided. Not only must the law be interpreted, but it must be applied to a particular set of 
facts, and a determination must be made of the probability of error (as defined by prior cases), relative to the specific 
time, place and circumstance of the given case.  Thus, stare decisis is justified on the grounds that it provides a basis for 
legal decision making when "the correct answer" cannot be known with a high degree of certainty.  For the court this is 
efficient because it minimizes error probability, because it minimizes the cost and probability of judicial review, and 
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because it maximizes the public good aspect of legal decision making.  Further, this process avoids the need to fully 
understand the technical processes used by the "experts," especially when those opinions are contradicted by other (just 
as well qualified) "experts;" it is quicker and less costly to rely upon; and, the possibility of being jerked around by 
stonewalling "hired guns" is minimized. 
 
Judging the Legal Acceptability of the Economist's Estimate 
 
 Individual economists may or may not appreciate the value of legal decision making by precedent, since that 
process makes it much more difficult to gain acceptance of an estimate based on the unique circumstances of any 
specific case.  Unique circumstances, objectively analyzed, very often yield estimates that can be made to appear outside 
all legal precedent.  Consequently, if the economist is to adequately prepare for critical questioning of any specific 
calculation, or set of calculations, an estimate of the degree of judicial acceptance needs to be made a preceding part of 
the preparation to give testimony. 
 
 Two possible approaches for making such estimates are Joan Robinson's logic-deductive approach and the 
error-learning model approach. The logic deductive approach is usually significantly less costly in time and other 
resources, and meets the goal of assuring that an estimate will be minimally acceptable under conditions of stare decisis, 
especially when done in conjunction with the employing entity (usually the lawyer for either the plaintiff or the 
defendant).  Loosely stated this approach requires the economist to be aware of and to take into account the most legal 
relevant rulings in the immediate vicinity.  Often, this can be accomplished by simply studying a survey of relevant case 
histories.  These may be prepared by the lawyer charged with trying the case, or be available for review (with minimal 
research) in a local law school library, or found on the computer by using legal search software. 
 
 The error-learning equation approach is much more costly.  However, given unique circumstances that are 
likely to result in unusual findings, it is more likely to better prepare the testifying economist when presenting his 
findings in court, and/or to be better prepared to consult with the employing attorney as to arrangements which might 
lead to an acceptable out-of-court settlement, if either is convinced that the convening court will not accept the economic 
analysis (a sometimes necessary second best solution). 
 
 While there may be a significant problem with obtaining adequate data for the statistical analysis, the 
theoretical and quantitative processes for forecasting acceptable settlements, given stare decisis, are quite simple.  The 
predicted settlement for a future case equals the amount of any current settlement plus an error-learning amount 
specified by the extent and direction of errors in predicting past settlements.  The weight of the past predicting errors is 
assumed to decline with the passage of time.  A primary result of this assumption is to make the process much simpler, 
since errors from the distance past are considered to have very minor or no impact on current expectations.  The 
equation for settlement expectation then takes the following arithmetic form: 
 
t+1Et = St + f(St - tEt-1 - t-1Et-2...,St-n - t-n + 1Et-n), 
 
where:  E = expected settlement,  
 
S = actual settlement,  
pre-subscripts = time for which the prediction is made, and 
post-subscripts = time in which the prediction is observed. 
 
 Thus, St is the actual short run settlement for period t and tEt-1 is the expected settlement for period t predicted 
in period t - 1.  Verbally, the expected acceptable settlement in the next time period is a function of any current 
settlement plus the discrepancy between actual and predicted settlements in preceding n time periods.  Application of 
this process allows the forensic economist to quantitatively examine the past record of the specific judge and/or the 
specific jurisdiction in which the current case is being tried.  Results obtained by this process are then compared to the 
amounts computed for the given, unique case, providing the analyst with information needed when formulating plans on 
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how to best provide an acceptable legal justification. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 In summary, once the economist has completed his analysis and interpretation of the results, he proceeds to a 
diagnoses of the qualitative and/or statistical difference in the estimates in comparison to previously adjudicated cases.  
This provides a basis for determining how elaborate a preparation must be undertaken in preparing to give testimony 
within the judicial institutional framework, either on-the-stand or by deposition. 
 
 In conclusion, it is specifically advocated that in no instance should economic criteria be subjugated to legal 
criteria.  Rather, it is proposed that the economist:  (1) do analysis according to criteria common to the art and science of 
the discipline; (2) be fully aware of the relative degree of acceptability of the results, as viewed by the judicial system; 
and, (3) be prepared to simultaneously present and justify the analytical and statistical results.  By doing this the 
economist should be able to order his analysis and presentation in such a manner as to maximize the probability of the 
court's acceptance of those results. That is, the economist should take ante precautions, rather than putting himself in the 
position of having to provide a post hoc justification as to why his findings are not acceptable within the legal-
institutional framework. 
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